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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 78-2a3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant claims the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in finding for
Appellee.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Appellant argues that the Trial Court's finding that there was not a material
and substantial change of circumstances to warrant an increase in child support is a
legal conclusion and that the issue should be reviewed for "correctness" and not be
given any special deference. However all of Appellant's issues presented on appeal
are fact-dependant and therefore the Findings of the Trial Court should be reviewed
"under a clearly erroneous standard." Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah
1999).
"For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving
all disputes in the evidence in light most favorable to the trial court's determinations."
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
1

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as
the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in
open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court.
In defining the role of the Trial Court, the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
This standard is highly deferential to the trial court because it is
before that court that the witnesses and the parties appear and
the evidence is adduced. The judge of the court is therefore
considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to gain from a cold
record.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936 (Utah 1994). HattieDe Vas v. Brock Howard Noble
and Ann Noble, 369 P.2d 290, 293 (Utah 1962).
Appellee's issues for review:
Whether Appellant can challenge the Findings of Fact where Appellant has not
marshaled the evidence.
Where an Appellant has not marshaled the evidence, he must accept the
findings as they are. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,941 (Utah 1994); Tucker v. Tucker,
910 P.2d 1209, 1217 (Utah 1996).
The Trial Court did not err in its ruling for Appellee and the Record supports
this ruling.
2

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
§ 78-45-7.12. Income in Excess of Tables.
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support
amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount
ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the
table for the number of children due support.
§ 78-45-7.5(4)(a)-(b). Determination of Gross Income.
(4)(a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a
business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses
required for self-employment or business operation from gross
receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an
appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be
deducted from gross receipts.
"In child support cases where parental income exceeds the guidelines, the
parties must introduce evidence to establish the reasonable needs of the children. A
demonstration of an increase in the obligor's income alone is not sufficient to increase
the child support order." Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
"In cases where the parties1 income exceeds the highest monthly combined
adjusted gross income listed on the statutory table, linear extrapolation of the child
support obligation table alone is not enough; strict reliance on linear extrapolation
would be erroneous, because taken to the extreme, a child could be awarded support
3

vastly exceeding any reasonable need." See Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah
Ct.App. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petitioner filed a Verified Petition to Modify Order seeking to increase child
support and have Respondent pay for 100% of all medical costs for the parties' minor
child. The case was tried before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson and Petitioner has
appealed the Order of the Third District Court.
B.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The District Court ruled as follows:
L

Petitioner's Verified Petition to Modify Order was denied;

2.

Respondent was ordered to continue to pay the amount of $728.00 per
month to Petitioner for child support;

3.

Respondent was ordered to establish a college fund for the parties'
minor child and pay $50.00 per month into the college fund until the
minor child reaches the age of eighteen; and

4.

Respondent was the prevailing party, however, due to equitable
considerations Respondent's request for attorneys' fees was denied.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were never married and never lived together.

1.

Petitioner filed a Verified Petition to Modify Order on or about

September 25,2001.
2.

Petitioner filed an amended Petition to Modify asking that Respondent

pay for 100% of all medical and dental expenses.
3.

A Trial was held on Thursday May 8, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. with the

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. Petitioner's Petition was denied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioner did not show in her Petition or at Trial on May 8, 2003 that there
had been any substantial change of circumstances justifying a change in the 1999
Order fixing child support. Petitioner failed to show that the reasonable needs of
the minor child were not being met. Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence
in this appeal. Petitioner was not the prevailing party and it was proper that she
not be awarded attorneys' fees.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER
MARSHALL

HAS
THE

FAILED TO
EVIDENCE

An Appellant may not ask for a second opinion on a debatable question of fact,
5

particularly when the finding rests on a judgment of weight and credibility. In re ST,
928 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
[the] marshaling concept does not reflect a desire to merely have
pertinent excerpts from the record readily available to a
reviewing court.
The marshaling process is not unlike
becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate himself
or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw
in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon
the evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The Trial Court made the following Findings of Fact, and the
Appellant has failed to present "in a comprehensive and fastidious order" any fatal
flaws in the evidence which show that the decision of the Trial Court "is clearly
erroneous:"
1.

"When the parties' combined income exceeds $10,000.00, the child

support is based upon the reasonable needs of the child." [Findings of Fact No. 9;
R-640]
2.

"Respondent's income is irrelevant." [Findings of Fact No. 11; R-

641]

6

3.

"Respondent's income has not increased from $10,549.00 (granted

by Order in 1999) to $448,023.00 annually (present) because you just can't take
Respondent's tax return and divide the return by the number of months in a year.
Respondent is responsible to pay taxes and there are also business expenses to
calculate, which are indicated in his return on the schedules. Respondent's income
has increased, but that increase standing by itself has nothing to do to [sic] with
whether or not there is a difference in the child's needs from 1999 to the present."
[Findings of Fact No. 16; R-641]
4.

"The minor child in question is an eleven year old girl. The Court

has trouble believing that it is physically possible for the minor child to participate
in all the activities presented to the Court" [Findings of Fact No. 17; R-642].
5.

"The Court has difficulties with Petitioner's credibility as to the

expenses of the activities for the minor child. The Exhibits are not accurate.
There are no reasonable explanations for how these expenses are being covered."
[Findings of Fact No. 18; R-642]
6.

"$450.00 per month for extracurricular activities is not reasonable."

[Findings of Fact No. 19; R-642]
7.

"Child support is not designed to insure that the minor child lives in

the same kind of house that Respondent's other children live in. This is not an
alimony case." [Findings of Fact No. 20; R-642]
7

8.

"No evidence was presented to show that the reasonable needs of

the child had changed since the 1999 modification" [Findings of Fact No. 21; R642].
9.

'The reasonable needs of the child are being met." [Findings of

FactNo.22;R-642]
The Trial Judge made the following comment after the parties presented
their evidence to the Trial Court:
The fact that Mr. Russell, if it is a fact, and frankly I don't
think it is, you just can't take four hundred and fort;/ eight
hundred and twenty-three dollars and divide it by twelve and
say that's your income. You got to turn the page on the
income tax return. You got to pay a few taxes on four
hundred and forty-thousand dollars last time I checked with
the I.R.S. and that was middle of last month. And there are
also business expenses on a sub chapter S. Those are all
legitimate deductions and they're right here in, right her in the
schedules and I don't pretend to be any tax wizard but I can
figure that much out. So I see no reason to believe that Mr.
Russell's income has gone from what it was determined to be
ten thousand five hundred in nineteen ninety-nine up to
thirteen hundred, thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand or
whatever the figure he gave me was. [T. T. 144-145].

The Petitioner argues that Respondent's income should be $448,823.00 per
year. However, the evidence presented at Trial clearly show that Respondent had
business deductions to calculate. [Trial Exhibit 4]. The Petitioner has failed to
ferret out a flaw with the evidence and show that the gravity of this flaw is

8

sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence was clearly erroneous.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING
THAT THERE WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE
OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE RESPONDENT'S
INCOME WAS CORRECTLY DETERMINED
The evidence supports the Trial Court's ruling, even if there were errors:
A fundamental principle of appellate procedure is that an error
which is not accompanied by prejudice or injury is not grounds
for reversal. Therefore, an appellate brief should not be
muddled with claims of error that are harmless. "Tor an error
to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'"
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 920 (Utah 1987)).
The proper test for determining whether an error is harmless is set forth in Rule
61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence,
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done
or omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order,
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Utah Appellate Courts have interpreted this standard as being congruent with
the harmless error requirements set forth in the Utah Rules of Evidence. State v.
9

Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 1989) (recognizing that there are standards for
harmless error found in Utah Evidence, Civil, and Criminal Rules). Utah Rule of
Evidence 103(a) provides that "(e)rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (a
proper, timely objection was made)."
The Appellant must convince the Court that the error was prejudicial. This
requires that the Appellant show that the error complained of affected the outcome of
the case. See Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482,489 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Petitioner's argument that the Trial Court erred in determining whether there
was a substantial change of circumstances in Respondent's income and whether the
Trial Court erred in determining the Respondent's true income, even if correct, are
harmless errors because this information is not relevant to the ultimate issue of child
support modification.
The Petitioner correctly points out that "The court has continuing jurisdiction
to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support..." Utah Code Annotated § 30-35(3). Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(2)(a)
and (b) also states that "The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child
support.

The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations
10

required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of the
guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are presumed
to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section". Utah Code
Annotated § 78-45-7.12 provides as follows:
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support
amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount
ordered may not be less than the highest level specified in the
table for the number of children due support.
"In child support cases where parental income exceeds the guidelines, the
parties must introduce evidence to establish the reasonable needs of the children. A
demonstration of an increase in the obligor's income alone is not sufficient to increase
the child support order." Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
In cases where the parties' income exceeds the highest monthly combined
adjusted gross income listed on the statutory table, linear extrapolation of the child
support obligation table alone is not enough. If taken to the extreme, a child could be
awarded support vastly exceeding any reasonable need. See Ball v. Peterson, 912
P.2d 1006 at 1014 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Petitioner must therefore prove that the reasonable needs of the child are not
being met at the current level of support. The current level of support is presumed
correct pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-7.2(a). Therefore, Petitioner must
11

show that the reasonable needs of the child are not being met in order for the court to
modify the child support amount. The Trial Court stated, "It doesn't really matter
how much money Mr. Russell makes." [T. T. 142] "What matters is what are the
reasonable needs of the child." [T. T. 142] "So it doesn't really matter what Mr.
Russell makes." [T. T. 143]
The correct standard according to Utah Statutes and recent case law is that in
order to modify a child support award in cases where the parties' combined adjusted
gross income exceeds the highest level specified in the table the parties must
introduce evidence to establish the reasonable needs of the children. The Trial Court
found that the reasonable needs of the child were being met. [Findings of Fact No. 22;
R-642] Therefore, even if the Trial Court erred in determining Respondent's true
income this would be a harmless error. Appellant attempts to seize upon arcane issues
of tax law and accounting to show that the lower court erred. There was no error and
even if there were the error it is immaterial, irrelevant and harmless.
Petitioner also tries to argue case law from other jurisdictions which the Trial
Court declined to follow because it is not the controlling law in the State of Utah.
[T. T. 148] Petitioner argues that there is a trend in other jurisdictions that favor
sharing the wealth of the parents with the minor children. The facts of each of the
cases cited in Appellant's Brief to support this argument differ substantially from this
case. All but one of the cases cited in Appellant's brief concerned children from
12

divorced parents where the children grew accustomed to a certain standard of living
during their parent's marriage.
Petitioner cites to a California case and claims that California is typically on
the cutting edge of new law. A careful reading of this case (White v. Marciano, 190
Cal. App.3d 1026 (1987)) reveals that California actually took a similar approach to
the Utah Courts. In this case the mother (custodial parent) argued for $3,500.00 per
month for child support from the natural father. The father stipulated that he had the
ability to pay any reasonable support order, including the $3,500.00 per month
requested by the mother, but contended that $3,500.00 per month was excessive. He
also admitted that he had an income of approximately $1 million per year. The Case
went to Trial and the Trial Court ordered the father to pay $1,500.00 per month for
child support even though the father admitted he could pay any reasonable amount of
child support including the $3,500.00 from his income of approximately $1 million
per year. The Trial Court was guided by criteria set forth in applicable California
statutes, relevant California case law and California's legislative intent that children
share in their parents' standard of living, however the Trial Court noted that support
must be reasonable under the circumstances. Stargell v. Stargell, 263 Cal. App.2d at
p. 507. What amount is "reasonable" is defined in relation to a child's "needs" and
varies with the circumstances of the parties. Singer v. Singer, 7 Cal. App.3d 807, 813
(1970). The Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court's award of $ 1,500.00 per month
13

for child support, even though as previously mentioned the father's income was
approximately $1 million per year and he agreed he could pay $3,500.00 per month.
This case illustrates the need to look at the reasonable needs of the child in
determining a support award.
Another recent case decided in Massachusetts declined to follow the "incomesharing" method that Appellant is essentially arguing by her cites to cases outside this
jurisdiction. See Pearson v. Pearson, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 156, 751 N.E.2d 921. Some
States considering the question of gross disparity of income have applied an "incomesharing" method that is designed to maintain the pre-divorce standard of living of the
children after an intact family splits into two households. See White v. Marciano,
190 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1031-1032, 235 Cal.Rptr. 779 (1987); Galbis v. Nadal, 626
A.2d26,31 (D.C.1993); Zakv. Zak, 629So.2d 187,188-189 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993);
Boyt v. Rornanow, 664 So.2d 995, 996-999 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995);

Pratt v.

McCullough, 100 Ohio App.3d 479, 481-482, 654 N.E.2d 372 (1995); Branch v.
Jackson, 427 Pa.Super. 417, 419-420, 629 A.2d 170 (1993). In the Massachusetts
case, the court stated that a pure income-sharing approach is problematic because it
does not account for the noncustodial parent whose income far exceeds any
reasonable needs the child might have. Courts have generally rejected pure incomesharing because this approach may constructively distribute the noncustodial parent's
estate, provide a windfall to the child and custodial spouse, and infringe upon the
14

noncustodial parent's right to direct the lifestyle of his or her children. Dubbed in
literature the 'Three Pony Rule" (i.e., no child needs three ponies), the doctrine has
earned cachet. See Coleman v. Coleman, 648 So.2d 605, 606-607 (Ala.Civ.App.
1994) (upholding an award exceeding the statutory presumptive level where it
correlated with the reasonable and necessary needs of the children); See Voishan v.
Palma, 327 Md. 318,322-324,609 A.2d 319 (1992) (upholding an award exceeding
the statutory presumptive level where the court determined the reasonable needs of
the child and then calculated each parent's proportionate share). See In re Marriage
of Upson, 991 P.2d 341, 344-345 (Colo.Ct.App. 1999) (remanding for findings on
the children's needs because the court could not deviate upwards from the statutory
presumptive level solely on the basis of the parties' gross economic disparity).
Notwithstanding Appellant's assertions, the trend in other jurisdictions actually
is to look to the reasonable needs of the minor children. Whatever other states may
or may not do, the controlling cases in Utah (Reinhart, supra) clearly show that in
order to award child support in excess of the guidelines, the Courts must first look to
the reasonable needs of the child. The Trial Court in this case determined that the
reasonable needs of the child were being met.
POINT III
APPELLANT IS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY AND
THEREFORE ATTORNEYS' FEES SHOULD NOT BE
AWARDED TO APPELLANT
15

Respondent was the prevailing party, however the Trial Court did not award
him attorneys' fees based upon equitable considerations as opposed to entitlement.
[T. T. 151] Petitioner has failed to marshal the evidence and show that the Trial
Court's ruling is clearly erroneous, therefore, Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees
should be denied and the Trial Court's ruling upheld. Respondent should be awarded
attorneys' fees.
POINT IV
THE PARTIES AGREED TO SHARE MEDICAL AND
DENTAL EXPENSES AND THEIR AGREEMENT
SHOULD NOT BE ALTERED
The parties both signed a Stipulation to Modify Support Order on or about July
7, 1999. [R-184-187]

The aforementioned Stipulation provided that the parties

would share equally all out-of-pocket medical and dental expenses for the child
including insurance premiums, deductibles, co-payments and all other reasonable and
necessary uninsured medical and dental expenses.
Petitioner acknowledges in her arguments that when child support was
modified in 1999 Respondent's income was in excess of $10,000.00 per month, yet
she agreed to the sharing of medical and dental expenses. Respondent is current on
all ordered medical and dental payments. The Trial Court stated the following, "He's
paying half the orthodontic bills. He's paying half the non-covered medical bills and
16

he's paying half the daycare bills and apparently he's paid for all those. And that was
the parties's [sic] deal. That was the arrangement. They all agreed to that." [T. T.
143] Petitioner failed to show that there was a substantial change of circumstances
since she agreed to share equally in the medical and dental expenses in 1999. The
Trial Court denied her request and the Trial Court's decision should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has failed to show any legal basis to reverse the Trial Court. The
decision of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of September, 2004.

KING & KING

By:
SCOTT DOPP
FELSHAW KING
Attorneys for Appellee
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Grant W. P. Morrison
MORRISON & MORRISON
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DATED this 13th day of September, 2004.
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